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THE CAPACITY TO MARRY
JOHN T. FINNEGAN, J.C.D.t
n this paper we are speaking about the capacity to marry, not the
right to marry. Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Populorum Progressio
(art. 37) states emphatically that every man has the inalienable right
to marry, but as we know not all men have the capacity to do so. The
law of the Church states that the capacity to marry is dependent upon
the ability to understand and will marriage, and the capacity to place
acts per se apt for the generation of children (canon 1081 ). Incapacities
to marry have traditionally been placed in the intellectual defect of con-
sent or in the physical incapacity to cohabit and beget, and we are aware
of the distinction relative and absolute incapacity in this regard.
There are two approaches possible in treating this subject. Canonists
have still to research the psychological advances, particularly in the areas
of the psychopath-sociopath, and come up with a norm or standard re-
garding capacity to marry. Perhaps such an investigation will never
produce more than a general requirement of physical and psychic health,
and such a norm has already been suggested' in the abundant writings
on this topic.2 Another approach, less complicated yet quite important,
* Paper prepared for a seminar conducted at the convention of The Canon Law
Society of America, Boston, September 11-12, 1968. Reprinted with permission
from the April 1969 issue of The Jurist.
t Pope John XXIII National Seminary, Weston, Massachusetts.
1 "He is incapable of entering a valid marriage who because of lack of due dis-
cretion proportionate to the marriage contract is rendered thereby unable to assume
validly each and every essential right and obligation of the contract."
"If such incapacity be dubious either by doubt of law or by doubt of fact, the
marriage is not for that reason prevented." Cf. John R. Keating, "Marriage of the
Psychopathic Personality," Chicago Studies, Spring, 1964, at 38.
2 The major creative work in this field is John R. Keating, The Bearing of Mental
Impairment on the Validity of Marriage-An Analysis of Rotal Jurisprudence
(Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964). Other works derivative in nature
are: John R. Keating, "The Caput Nullitatis in Insanity Cases," THE JURIST,
Oct. 1962; John R. Keating, "Sociopathic Personality," THE JURIST, Oct. 1965;
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is to reflect on the contemporary under-
standing of capacity to marry in the light
of what legal and structural changes are
necessitated by this comprehension. It is to
this task that the following proposals ad-
dress themselves.
The first proposal is as follows: the
advances in the behavioral sciences place
great emphasis on the psychological ca-
pacity to enter marriage. The Code of
Canon Law on marriage accepts the two-
fold division of man in regard to mental
health: 3 one, the person suffering from
illness which progresses to major mental
disabilities. The Code calls this "amentia."
The second category is all those of sound
health. That portion of mankind which
does not fall into these ready-made cate-
gories are all those who hold beliefs
generally unsupported by evidence, and
considered by many as irrational and fan-
tastic, and who are an interesting interlude
in the boredom of normalcy, but who are
legally capable of marriage and begetting
their kind. Contemporary psychiatry, how-
ever, has given us a third group in regard
to mental health. These people are in-
capable of leading normal lives, and their
behavior causes great stress in every com-
munity. Traditionally, they have not had a
John R. Keating, "The Legal Test of Marital
Insanity," Studia Canonica, Vol. 1-1, 1967; John
Rogg Schmidt, "Mental Impairment and Mar-
riage," THE JURIST, Oct. 1965; Aurelio Sab-
batini, "L'evolution de la jurisprudence," Studia
Canonica, Vol. 1-2, 1967; "Jurisprudence cano-
nique-Le Tribunal d'Appel de Montr6al,"
Studia Canonica, Vol. I-1, 1967, pp. 111-125;
John T. Finnegan, "The Current Jurisprudence
Concerning the Psychopathic Personality," THE
JURIST, July 1967.
3 J. R. Keating, Studia Canonica, op. cit., p. 23.
categorical haven in civil or canon law, and
much of the tension between law and medi-
cine has been to find a mutually acceptable
response to these relatively unclassified
people. The medical and legal term cur-
rently in vogue to categorize this group is
psychopathic-sociopathic personality.4
The Code of Canon Law understands
"marital insanity (amentia)" as an intel-
lectual defect in consent. Beginning in 1941
there was an attempt to shift the capacity
to marry from a total reliance on intelli-
gence, apprehension and comprehension as
related to consent, to a consideration of the
aptitude of the parties to fulfill the contract
from a behavioral point of view. Although
initially unsuccessful, there has been a
change over the past twenty-five years from
an emphasis on capacity as capacitas in-
telligendi et volendi to the addition of
capacitas sese obligandi.5
My second proposal is: these advances
resist canonical formulation as factors nec-
essary to enter a valid marriage, and di-
minish the clarity and certainty of Tribunal
decisions in evaluating the validity of mar-
riage. Once we commence to emphasize
the capacity to oblige oneself (in the be-
havioral sense) to life-long commitments,
and the capacity to assume the obligations
4Hervey Cleckley, M.D., The Mask of Sanity
(St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., fourth edition,
1964), p. 27ff. This is the standard medical
work on the psychopathic/sociopathic person-
ality. A shorter work good for introductory in-
formation and terminology is: Vernon W. Grant,
This is Mental Illness (Boston: Beacon Press,
1963).
5 J. R. Keating, The Bearing of Mental Impair-
ment on the Validity of Marriage-An Analysis
of the Rotal Jurisprudence, op. cit., pp. 154-200.
and responsibilities of such a close inter-
personal communion as marriage, then we
introduce elements into marriage suitability
that resist canonical formulation. What we
have done in our marriage law is add the
"due discretion" standard of St. Thomas.
For him "discretion" is not the same as
knowledge, nor is lack of discretion the
same as ignorance. "Discretion" is a quality
of the spiritual faculties, a vigor, maturity.
Rotal decisions understood it as "debita
discretio seu maturitas judicii."'6 No longer
do we look at capacity as solely the correct
answer to the question: "does this person
enjoy the capacity to enter marriage in ac-
cord with canons 1081, 1082 and 1086?"
At this time we also must ask, "does this
person enjoy that greater degree of dis-
( "Quando deficit huiusmodi maturitas judicii
sufficiens ad matrimonium intelligendum vel
eligendum, sive id proveniat ex habituali aliena-
tione animi, sive ex exturbatione transeunti, sive
ex psychica debilitate habetur amentia in sensu
contractuali." Cf. Monitor Ecclesiasticus, vol.
LXXXVI (1961), p. 632.
"Pariter incapax etiam est habendus qui, etsi
intellectu sufficienti praeditus, tamen hoc de-
fectum discretionis vel maturitas judicii nequit
elicere actum voUntatis quo matrimonium initur,
cum careat illa libertate electionis ab intrinseco
qua deficiente actus vere humanus non existit.
Sed insuper incapax censeri debet qui, etsi sciens
et volens consensum emisit, tamen ob suam mentis
infirmitatem serio non potest matrimonium con-
trahere, utpote incapax libere eligendi officia es-
sentialia connubii, status psycho-pathologici
causa. Provincia enim voluntatis non raro per-
turbatur secundum quid, nempe, quoad aliquam
sectionem partialem activitatis psychicae, minui-
tur vel aufertur libertas electionis, quae per se
saltem manet dum sufficienti discretione quoad
reliquam sphaeram voluntatis; etsi generatim
aliquatenus minuitur discretio quum graviter
perturbatur aliqua zona activitatis psychologi-
cae." Coram Bonet (Bostonien), P.N. 8791 of
March 23, 1968.
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cretion required to assume effectively the
obligations which arise from an integral act
of consent?" Once you ask this latter ques-
tion . . . you introduce elements of uncer-
tainty, you reduce the legal clarity and
objectivity of the canonical norms, and we
cast ourselves into the mainstream of the
legal-medicine tension that has been char-
acteristic of this century in civil society.
Thirdly, I propose that these tensions
should evoke from canon lawyers the same
response civil lawyers have made to iden-
tical pressures, viz., a greater emphasis on
counselling procedures. While the Church
has advanced from the understanding of
capacity to marry as enumerated in the
Code of Canon Law to the additional in-
sights of the Rotal decisions in the past
fifteen years which now recognize be-
havioral incapacity to oblige oneself, civil
society would call this advancement, "the
progress from McNaughton to Durham."7
The McNaughton Rule of 1843 required the
criminal know the "nature and quality of
his act . . .", and if he did not, then he was
inculpable because of insanity. Implicit in
the McNaughton Rule was the two-fold
understanding of man as found in the
canonical marriage legislation; i.e., those
who understand right from wrong, and
those who do not. The inadequacy of the
McNaughton standard has been advocated
since the beginning of this century, and the
growing acceptance of the psychiatric pro-
fession has been responsible for this.8
7Sheldon Glueck, Law and Psychiatry-Cold
War or Entente Cordiale? (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), cf., Chap. I entitled,
"From McNaughton to Durham," pp. 41-78.
8 A few states have yet to change the McNaugh-
ton Rule. Cf. the lead editorial in the Boston
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Lawyers have tended to look upon psy-
chiatrists as fuzzy thinkers and apologists
for criminals, while psychiatrists tend to
regard lawyers as devious and cunning
Herald, Nov. 29, 1958 entitled, "Who Killed
Jack Chester?" It is as follows:
"Jack Chester, who murdered his girl friend,
hanged himself yesterday in his State prison cell.
"That's what the news report says. But the
real killer of Jack Chester was the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. Chester was merely the
hangman-his own hangman. How can this be
said when Governor Furcolo had already asked
the Executive Council to commute Chester's
death sentence to life imprisonment and the
Council was preparing to do so? It can be said
because the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
observes to this moment the McNaughton Rule,
an archaic legal interpretation which permits a
defense of insanity in murder cases only if the
accused cannot distinguish between right and
wrong or is driven by an irresistible compulsion.
"A jury decided that Jack Chester knew right
from wrong, and that the compulsion which
drove him to shoot Beatrice Fishman nine times
was not irresistible. One cannot quarrel with a
conscientious jury's decision. Yet who can deny
that Chester was suffering from a serious illness
of the mind?
"The illness was characterized by a sense of
guilt so great that Chester could accept for him-
self no punishment less than death-the punish-
ment he meted out to himself yesterday. What
would have happened if the jury had not had
to judge Chester by the McNaughton Rule; if
some more realistic rule had applied and had
been found innocent by reason of substantial
mental defect and confined in a mental hospital?
One cannot be certain. Individuals with deep
nihilistic urges seek satisfaction with terrible
single-mindedness. Suicides do occur in mental
institutions. But such institutions generally are
more alert to prevent suicide attempts. And Jack
Chester stood a better chance of having his urge
alleviated in a mental institution.
"How long will Massachusetts continue to
subject its deranged killers to the deadly injustice
of the McNaughton Rule? The Commonwealth
of Massachusetts killed Jack Chester." Cf. Glu-
eck, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
phrasemongers. To avoid this tension in
ecclesiastical matters the Rota has been
explicit on several occasions in regard to
the role and competence of medical periti,
and the obligation to reflect this competence
in judicial decisions. 9 The jurist holds
offenders culpable; the psychiatrist main-
tains human behavior is largely condi-
tioned by subconscious forces, and crucial
experiences of early and dependent child-
hood. The jurist proclaims "tout com-
prendre c'est tout pardonner," leads to
permissiveness. The noise and din of the
psychiatrists has at least made this much of
an impression; that in most areas of society
the McNaughton standard has given away
to Durham... the 1954 U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia, decision10
that stated criminals "are not responsible if
the unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect." 11 Instead of clar-
ifying McNaughton, this decision opens up
a large grey area of uncertainty in legal
life. The reason for doing this is perhaps
best explained in the words of Justice
Holmes: "the life of the law has not been
logic, it has been experience." Modern
scientific experience has returned the mys-
tery to man,'12 and maintains that most
9"Decisions and Decrees-Inadequate or Psy-
chopathic Personality," T'HE JURIST, January
1967, pp. 102-103.
10 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
11 Glueck, op. cit., pp. 79-132.
12 The Cartesian-Kantian mathematical influ-
ence established a mind-set in the 17-19th cen-
turies that looked at man and the psyche in a
highly abstract, depersonalized and scientific
manner. In this framework the essentially good
man was the obedient one-the man who ac-
tuated the clear and distinct ideas of thought
with the moral imperative of duty. The Church
men need assistance in living a fully human
life. The result of this tension between law
and medicine resulting after Durham has
had at least this positive result: a greater
emphasis on psychiatric care, and a greater
respect for the counselling profession as
teachers in the HOW of human life and
endeavor. The natural reciprocity between
civil and ecclesiastical experience has made
the Church sensitive to goals and achieve-
ments of the psychiatric and counselling
professions. Psychiatrists of today are sug-
gesting to the jurist that in criminal law the
guilty and not guilty verdict confine itself
to the facts, but in the area of premedita-
tion, motivation, intent, etc. that there be
in this context is the voice of God urging the
correct interplay of thought and duty, and laws
once made and known are the civil and ecclesi-
astical way of guiding man to the perfect life.
These "deterministic" explanations of human
nature were in keeping with the Newtonian Age
and its infatuation with mathematics and sci-
ence. The last fifty years have been character-
ized by Freud's discovery of the 'sub-conscious'
which upsets the harmony and mutuality be-
tween ideas and duty, and likewise Einstein
failed in his attempt to restore the unity of
science. These and numerous other technologi-
cal achievements have pushed man outside his
own world of certainty and mathematical pre-
dictability to the cosmological and personal
realms of uncertainty. Because of this, law as
the warp and woof of human relationships must
now be seen as the provisional instrument of
society enabling men to tap the correct resources
of encouragement and direction as they cope
with the rapidly emerging social and cultural
advances. The task then is to teach men how
to carry out what is good to do in such a chang-
ing environment. How can a person in the
uniqueness of his singularity and in the agency
of his own person make this law a meaningful
component in his own style of life? We must
teach our people to internalize their Christian
values, and this is radically different from telling
them what to do.
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the possibility of an intermediate verdict
between guilty and not guilty.13 Man is such
that in this area he requires assistance in
offsetting genetic, cultural, intellectual,
social and political liabilities, and he may
undertake adventures for which he is not
fully responsible. The thought of a tertium
to constat or non constat should do to the
canonical profession what it has done to
the legal profession in general, and that is,
motivate us to offer our support and en-
couragement to psychiatric and counselling
care. That we have such facilities already
is generally not due to the fact that canon
lawyers have recognized their limitations
and anthropological advances, but rather
due to the general pastoral concern of the
Church at large. It is time that we support
this trend with the professional backing of
canon lawyers.
My fourth proposition is that "moral
impotency" or the incapacity to marry will
1 Some have suggested as far back as 1925 that
a Socio-legal Commission or Treatment Tribunal
be established which would separate in person-
nel and technique the guilt-determining func-
tion of the Courts from the sentence-imposing
and succeeding steps. The following quote from
Aristotle is apt:
"The knowing what is just and what unjust,
men think no great instance of wisdom, because
it is not hard to understand those things of
which the laws speak. They forget that these are
not just acts except accidentally. To be just, they
must be done and distributed in a certain man-
ner. All this is a more difficult task than know-
ing what things are wholesome. For in this
branch of knowledge it is an easy matter to
know honey, wine, cautery, or the use of the
knife; but the knowing how one should ad-
minister these with a view to health, and to
whom, and at what time, amounts in fact to
being a physician." Nichoinachean Ethics, V,
viii, 1137a; cf. Glueck, op. cit., pp. 151-152.
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be more common today due to social and
occupational conditions that place great
stress on the making of a successful mar-
riage. "Moral impotency" is the moral in-
ability by reason of psychic defect to bind
oneself sub gravi to the substance of the
marriage contract. Perhaps "psychic im-
potency" would have been a better phrase,
but that already has a canonized meaning
in our legal tradition. So we say that one
who is morally impotent cannot assume the
essential obligations of marriage which
normally arise from sufficient consent. In
other words, some people do not have the
personal wherewithal, or ego-strength, to
undertake the contemporary experience of
marriage. What we are saying here in this
proposal is that marriage requires more
of a person today than it ever did in the
past.' 4 It takes more internal stamina to
make a success of marriage and family life
today. Marriage historically was lived in
an extended family situation where the
kinship group supplied all the necessary
encouragement and support of the union.
In addition the family was traditionally an
occupational unit where wife and children
were assets in helping the head of the
household provide for the family weal; the
family was the primary agent of socializa-
tion, caring for the sick and the aged; the
family was the chief support for Christian
ideals, recognition and affection; the family
was the link between the individual and the
larger community; the family was the main
source of recreation. We need not be re-
14 Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, "The Structure of the
Family in American Society"; Marriage: A
Psychological and Moral Approach, ed. William
C. Bier (New York: Fordham University Press,
1965), pp. 1-11.
minded that hardly any of these traditional
elements of family life are true today.15
Young couples because of the mobility of
our age live in "isolated conjugal units";
the head of the household no longer works
with his family finding children an occupa-
tional asset, but most likely the father
works outside the home and develops roles
of aggressiveness and hard-line business
tactics which he is expected to repudiate
when he concludes work and enters the
home; the highly educated mother no longer
finds the automated housekeeping chores
a challenge to her life or the realization of
her true potential; children within this con-
text are a genuine parental burden because
of the many years of education and effort
it requires to outfit a child for responsible
adulthood. Likewise, the family no longer
serves an economic function, nor is it the
bridge between the individual and the larger
society; nor does it generally fulfill a recre-
ation function; nor are we destitute when
the family collapses. What I am saying
here is that the capacity to marry today
means the capacity to build a marriage
largely stripped of external supports, and
one that will only survive by the love and
friendship of the partners themselves. 6
Love they say is the only ingredient that
holds today's marriage together. This is
not something to lament over, but is rather
15 "Marriage and the Division Among the
Churches," World Council of Churches Report
by the Secretariat for Faith and Order and the
Department of Men and Women in the Church,
ido-c dossier #67/21-22 of July 2, 1967, pp. 2-5.
16 E. Schillebeeckx, Marriage: Human Reality
and Saving Mystery (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1965), "General Introduction," pp. xv-
xxx; Andrew Greeley, "A Sex to Live With,"
The Critic, August-September 1968, pp. 32-43.
cause for rejoicing that married life will
survive and flourish only because people
are able in one way or another to grasp
and hold on to that central human ex-
perience, love. It means we must educate
our young to acquire the capacity to live
in a "nuclear family unit," and it means
also that Christian couples must feel the
guidance and direction of the Church as
they endeavor by their marriage to be a
model of Christ's love for His Church. We
must insure, insofar as it is possible, that
our people are morally capable to enter
and sustain marriage, but we must be
realistic enough to admit that many will be
"morally impotent" or incapable to under-
take the contemporary marital experience.
The fifth and last proposal is this: that
in an atmosphere of expanding knowledge
and personal Christian maturity, the ex-
cellence of the Christian life and moral
change can best be attained by counselling
methods. It is clear that Christian churches
must set a clear example of solicitude and
living concern for family life. While this
was always an anxiety of the Church it
must be even more so at this time. Not only
do we have the emergence of a "new mo-
rality" and new standards of Christian per-
fection, but we also have new social,
economic and cultural situations that dra-
matically threaten family unity and har-
mony. If Christian marriage is to remain
an example and leaven of society, then the
Church must develop expertise and facili-
ties to guide our people on the HOW of
contemporary family living in order to
equip them for this apostolate.
Counselling has long been used as an
instrument for psychological change. Not
so for moral change. Since Freud many
psychiatrists have felt that moral issues and
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judgments impede the therapeutic intent
of the counselling relationship. This attitude
has dramatically changed in the last decade
and work is now being done to adapt the
stages of psychological change to the area
of moral change in the quest of Christian
virtue. An indication of how this approach
would work in its adaptation to the realm
of moral change and in the service of the
integrity of Christian family life, is as fol-
lows: 17
First stage is the openness to experience
or availability to awareness
In a moral sense this is a trend toward
a more adequate and realistic moral per-
spective. Persons come to see their moral
behavior as not an isolated part of their
personality, and that moral action is never
simply a product of moral values or ethical
ideals. This is not a method that would lead
to an antinomian morass where all moral
judgments and culpability are eliminated,
but rather to a moral perspective which
tends to become more adequate and re-
alistic.
Second stage is a trend in which the in-
dividual's moral response
tends to be more authentic
Counselling takes the spurious and ar-
tificial out of moral behavior. It moves one
away from morality based on fixed precepts
toward a morality based on one's own inner
existence, on what he is at this present
17 Leroy Aden, "Counseling and Moral Change,"
Journal of Religion and Health, April 1968,
pp. 164-174. This section relies heavily on
Aden's article.
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moment. Again this would not be a move-
ment toward lawless subjectivity. It is
rather a new understanding of oneself and
a renewed capacity to live according to
one's deep nature. One's moral response
becomes more authentic as one gains an
increased capacity to respond to and live
out what he is in the present moment.
Third stage is the finalizing of the trend
in which the individual be-
comes a more trustworthy
locus of moral decision and
evaluation in accord and in
harmony with the highest
Christian ideals and his
present situation.
In the beginning of counseling the locus
of decision is at the periphery of one's
existence, either in a code of law, or in
some process within his own life. He often
has a divided self at this point and his
decisions are not a reliable reflection of
this total being. Consequently, he is not a
trustworthy judge of what is genuinely
fulfilling. Counseling tends to correct this
situation, and to assist the individual to be
a locus of moral action at the very center
of his being, and in keeping with the de-
mands of the Christian gospel.
If married couples had immediate access
to sound counseling based on modern psy-
chology and in keeping with Christian an-
thropology, it is felt that this service would
give great assistance in preserving the
Christian witness of family living. Even in
instances where the marriage has been dis-
rupted the individual must be guided along
lines of solid virtue in the formation of
conscience and in reconciling oneself to his
life situation.
In view of the above the following con-
clusions are offered:
1. The "capacity to marry" is more
complex than simple consent and the
voluntary acceptance of rights and duties.
It involves the psychological capacity and
necessary ego-strength to assume the mar-
ital obligations, and to undertake a close
interpersonal relationship. The absolute
certification of this capacity to marry is
beyond the scope of any ante-factum ca-
nonical norms.
2. The Matrimonial Tribunal system is
institutionally incapable of meeting the obli-
gations of the Church and the needs of
our people involved in a broken-marriage.
Our knowledge and understanding of man
has been enhanced by the advances in the
behavioral sciences and has resulted in the
greater appreciation of the mystery of man.
All this reduces the objectivity and cer-
tainty of judgments made on the Tribunal
level, and demands a corresponding pas-
toral emphasis on informed responsible
consciences. Such reduction in certitude on
the Tribunal level should not cause us to
disregard the "queen of the presump-
tions"' 8 (i.e., all acts are considered valid
unless proven otherwise), but it does offer
incentive for reform and inspires us to
search for complementary structures to aid
and comfort Christian marriage.
18 Article # 172, Instruction of the Sacred Con-
gregation of the Sacraments, August 15, 1936.
Canon 1014 is built on this principle. However,
criticism of this canon is not directed against the
principle itself, but rather to its excessive de-
mands of certitude. Cf. Stephen J. Kelleher,
"Canon 1014 and the American Culture," THE
JURIST, Jan. 1968.
3. Canon lawyers as professional men
must accept the limitations of their science,
and should urge greater counselling and
pastoral techniques for the preservation of
Christian marriage and for aiding the
broken-marriage.1 9
4. All parishes should establish Centers
for Family Living whose sole purpose is
for the preservation and enhancement of
Christian marriage and family life. This
Center would assist marriage where it is
needed most-in the area of common love
so often eroded by social and occupational
conditions. It has become increasingly clear
that the continuation of the child centered
parochial school system is no longer the
primary concern of the American Church.
20
The emphasis today should be on the
family, and we should initiate the foster
1'0 Cf. For the Family-International and Inter-
Church Cooperation for the Development of
Family Counselling and Family Education; Re-
port of a World Consultation held at St. Cergue,
Switzerland, July 25-August 2, 1967 (Geneva:
World Council of Churches, 1968). Pages 145-
165 may be consulted for an extensive bibliog-
raphy.
20The underlying sociological and theological
presuppositions of the American Catholic paro-
chial school system are no longer supportable.
In the mid-nineteenth century the family was
buttressed by a society favoring monogamy as
well as having extended kinship and occupa-
tional conditions that preserved the home. In this
atmosphere when the child left the home he was
threatened by an alien environment rooted in a
Protestant ethos which permeated the public
school system. This necessitated a private school
system to preserve the values of the Catholic
tradition. Neither of these situations are charac-
teristic of today's society. Rather, the contempo-
rary family is divided and rent asunder by recent
technological advances and sociological situa-
tions. It is imperative that a radical shift of em-
phasis be effected in the near future with a major
concern being directed to the preservation of
Christian family life and values.
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family-centered agencies and apostolates
on the parish level. If love is the only in-
gredient that holds the contemporary "nu-
clear family" together, then the Church
must bolster, enhance and strengthen this
love in every possible way. Feeding the
poor and hungry, seeking peace, eradicating
social injustice, fostering law and order,
reconciling the alienated and disenchanted
must be values that parents teach their
children, and hence our support focuses
on the primary social and educational unit
of society-the family. We must teach and
counsel our people on the HOW of Chris-
tian family living, and in the aftermath of
Humanae Vitae this concern reaches new
proportions.
5. All dioceses should establish a Pas-
toral Review Board to interview and discuss
the broken-marriage (i.e., one where there
is no apparent possibility of reconciliation)
before it is submitted for evaluation by the
Tribunal. This Board would be built on
the following principles:
a. the dignity and indissolubility of
the Christian conjugal union;
b. the "queen of the presumptions"
would be accepted;
c. the freedom of the informed Chris-
tian conscience;
d. the Matrimonial Tribunal is not
necessarily the final arbiter of God's Will
in regard to the validity of a certain
marriage;
e. moral change and the acceptance
of unusual life situations can best be
achieved in our day by counseling tech-
niques.
The members of the Pastoral Review
Board would be:
canonist-(advocate),
theologian,
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psychiatrist,
expert on social and family problems,
and priest-counselor.
The agenda of the Pastoral Review
Board would be to discuss the broken-
marriage and the reasons for its failure
with a view to forming a sound Christian
conscience in its regard. No effort would
be made to coerce this conscience. The
entire proceedings would be conducted
in a simple and sympathetic manner in
keeping with its non-juridic role.
It would be the work of this Board to
recommend petition for trial in the first
instance if grounds were present. Some
couples interviewed would have remarried
civilly or in another Church. They would
receive the personalized services of the
Pastoral Review Board, and in some in-
stances they could be helped by the Matri-
monial Tribunal. In all cases the parties
would experience the concern of the
Church, and would be assisted in finding a
modus vivendi in regard to their Catholic
faith and their human situation.
If the Matrimonial Tribunal had the ad-
vantage of dialogue and reciprocity with
the Pastoral Review Board many advan-
tages could possibly accrue to the legal
system. Its immediate effect would be to
diminish the legalistic taint of the Tribunal,
offer prompt pastoral assistance, person-
alize the services of the Matrimonial Court
and make more credible its final decisions,
and give aid in the delicate pastoral area
of forming a correct conscience and the
living of a wholesome human existence.
The long range advantages are difficult to
estimate, but the proximity and interaction
of the Matrimonial Tribunal and the Pas-
toral Review Board would be beneficial to
the on-going reform of Canon Law. (The
establishment of the Pastoral Review Board
does not indicate approval of the present
Tribunal system, nor the pace and content
of reform. Rather, it is a realistic expression
of something that could begin immediately,
meets a desperate pastoral need, and may
have results beyond our present hopes and
understanding.) 21
6. It is absolutely imperative that some
institutional response be given to the prob-
lem of the broken-marriage because the
contemporary emphasis on conscience, per-
sonalist values in marriage, freedom, Chris-
tian maturity and responsibility must be
guided by solid values in accord with our
21 "The delay involved because of antiquated
legal procedures (in the Matrimonial Tribunal)
is the institutionalized Church at its unchristian
worst.... " Theological Studies, June 1968,
"News Notes on Moral Theology," p. 299. Other
critics of the Matrimonial Tribunal system are:
John T. Finnegan, "When is a Marriage Indissol-
uble? Reflections on a contemporary under-
standing of a Ratified and Consummated
Marriage", THE JURIST, July 1968; Stephen J.
Kelleher, "The Problem of the Intolerable Mar-
riage," America, Sept. 14, 1968. These articles
conclude that the Tribunal system is dysfunc-
tional and irrelevant. However, it would be irre-
sponsible to do away with the Tribunal imme-
diately and thus create the erroneous impression
that the Roman Catholic tradition now favors
divorce. A better program would be to inaugu-
rate the Pastoral Review Board and let history
determine which has greater value in the service
of our Christian faith. Also, cf. Herbert T.
Neve, Sources for Change (Geneva: World
Council of Churches, 1968). "To stick rigidly
to this and other forms without questioning
them, and without, if they are found wanting,
seeking to replace or supplement them, is to be
imprisoned in the past, unintelligible in the
present, and failing to live out of the future.
Indeed, without such a searching analysis, one
may welt be preserving heretical structures, i.e.,
structures that impede the missio Dei." pp. 46-47.
tradition and the present understanding of
man and his environment. A decision of
the Matrimonial Court is no longer received
with unquestionable obedience. With the
diminishing confidence in the Matrimonial
Tribunal, and the popularizing of anti-
nomian attitudes, the reform of Canon Law
and the implementation of this recommen-
dation takes a new importance and ur-
gency.
7. In summary each diocese would es-
tablish (or consolidate) present structures.
DIOCESAN MATRIMONIAL BUREAU AND
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY LIFE
(with the following competencies)
I. For the preservation of Christian mar-
riage and family life-to be organized
on the diocesan and parish level
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Center for Family Living
(which will offer)
1. Family Life and Counselling Services
2. Pre-Cana and Cana Conferences
3. CFM and other family-centered
apostolates
II. For the pastoral care of the broken-
marriage-to be organized on the di-
ocesan level
1. Pastoral Review Board-for the
counselling, education and pastoral
assistance of all broken-marriages
2. The Matrimonial Tribunal-for bro-
ken-marriages offering possibility of
annulment.
